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Abstract  
The vote with the wallet is a new, emerging feature of economic participation and democracy in the globally-integrated 
market economy. This expression identifies the pivotal role that responsible consumption and investment can play in 
addressing social and environmental emergencies which have been aggravated by the asymmetry of power between 
domestic institutions and global corporations. In this paper, we examine (both in general and by using examples drawn 
from the financial and non-financial sectors) how “voting” for producers which are at the forefront of a three-sided 
efficiency which reconciles the creation of economic value with social and environmental responsibility, may generate 
contagion  effects  by  triggering  ethical  imitation  of  traditional  profit-maximizing  actors,  thereby  enhancing  the 
production of positive social and environmental externalities. Within this new framework policies which reduce the 
search and information costs of voting with the wallet may help socioeconomic systems to exploit the bottom-up market 
forces of other-regarding preferences, thereby enhancing opportunities to achieve well-being with reduced top-down 
government intervention. 
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1.  Introduction 
The standard textbook economic theory generally represents individuals as adopting purely self-
regarding  behaviour,  or,  more  specifically,  as  maximizing  their  own  monetary  payoffs.  This 
simplified  paradigm  has  been  strongly  criticized  by A m a r t h y a  S e n  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  a m o n g  o t h e r s ,  w h o  
argues  that  homo  economicus i s  a  “ r a t i o n a l  f o o l ” ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  r e d u c t i o n i s t  a s sumption  that 
individuals are driven only by their own monetary self-interest disregards the importance of two 
additional drivers of human behaviour - moral commitment and sympathy.
1 
                                                           
1 The issue has been dealt with, not without a certain amount of irony, by a number of well-known 
social scientists: Hayek called  homo  economicus th e  “ f a mily  sh a me” ,  a n d  F ra n k  sta te d  tha t h e  
would not let his daughter date a homo economicus.   2 
Do people really behave like homineseconomici? Empirical findings from Ultimatum Games (Güth, 
Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982, Camerer and Thaler  1995),  Dictator  Games  (Andreoni  and 
Miller 2002), Gift Exchange Games (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Reidl, 1993, Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold 
and  Gächter  1998),  Trust  Games  (Berg,  Dickhaut  and  McCabe  1995,  Ben-Ner  and  Putterman 
2006), and Public Good Games (Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 2001, Sonnemans, Schram and 
Offerman  1999,  Fehr  and  Gächter  2000)  provide  evidence  which  contradicts  this  simplified 
paradigm.  Results  from  this  research  have  documented,  in  fact,  that  the  vast  majority  of  the 
individuals participating in the experiments follow a broadened preference pattern which includes 
elements of (positive and negative) reciprocity (Rabin, 1993), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999, and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), other-regarding preferences (Cox, 2004), social welfare 
preferences  (Charness  and  Rabin,  2002),  and  various f o r m s  o f  p u r e  a n d  i m p u r e  ( w a r m  g l o w )  
altruism (Andreoni, 1989 and 1990).   
 
For the more sceptical, who believe that laboratory behaviour is an imperfect proxy for what people 
do in reality, the preferences revealed by actual consumer choices are a more reliable proof for the 
existence of other-regarding preferences. From this point of view, quasi-natural experiments on 
consumer purchases and the actual market shares of “ethical” products, which are generally sold at 
a positive price differential compared with equivalent “non-ethical” products (see Sections 2 and 3), 
represent the most important evidence for rejection of the anthropologically reductionist paradigm 
of the “rational fool”. 
 
Even more importantly, this theoretical and empirical literature documents that the presence of 
asymmetric information, contract incompleteness and limits to the enforcement of legal obligations 
make  social  dilemmas  an  everyday  feature  of  economic  life.  These  dilemmas,  which  are 
conventionally represented in Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Trust Games, and Public Good Games, are 
typical situations in which pecuniary self-interest is not just uncommon from an empirical point of 
view, but is also sub-optimal in terms of the creation of economic value. This is because, in most of 
these dilemmas, team or other-regarding preferences and high levels of trust and trustworthiness 
may allow players to reach equilibria which are superior from both an individual and an aggregate 
point of view.
2 Based on these considerations, economists are becoming increasingly interested in 
studying the law of motion of crucial values which induce people to accept “social risk”, such as 
trust, and, more generally, social capital, which is considered to be the ‘glue’ which holds the 
socioeconomic system together.
3 
                                                           
2 A further paradox is that when facing social dilemmas even game theorists do not follow Nash 
rationality (see Becker et al. 2005  findings on the traveller’s dilemma) 
3 The multifarious concept of social capital includes trust, and is defined in the literature in different 
ways. Putnam (1993:167) defines it as “social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that 
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”, while Guiso et al. (2008) 
define it as “the set of beliefs and values that foster cooperation.” According to Hong and Bohnet 
(2007), “trust… consists of the investor’s willingness to make herself vulnerable to others’ actions” 
while Fehr (2009) argues that “an individual (let’s call her the trustor or investor) trusts if she 
voluntarily places resources at disposal of another party (the trustee) without any legal commitment 
from the latter”. 
   3 
 
This increased attention to invisible pillars of economic life such as social capital confutes the 
widespread belief that values are unimportant for, if not actually harmful, to, economic life. This 
belief  has  been  fuelled  by  a  simplistic  extrapolation  of  the  famous  passage  in  Adam  Smith’s 
“Wealth  of  Nations”,  which  explains  how  market  mechanisms  act  as  an  invisible  hand  which 
magically transforms the pursuit of individual self-interest by each economic agent into something 
which is also socially desirable. As well known, the exceptions to the coincidence of private and 
social optimum are so numerous that they have become the  rule. Natural or imposed limits to  
competition, negative externalities, public goods and asymmetric information are so widespread and 
pervasive that they severely limit the benefits of the invisible hand, and make the coincidence of 
private and social optimum an ideal situation which cannot be attained, just like the benchmark of 
frictionless motion in physics.    
Another well-established metaphor in support of the optimistic view of the sufficiency  of self-
interest may be found in Mandeville. In the bee story, socioeconomic systems prosper like beehives 
simply because of the spontaneous coordination of self-interested actions by their inhabitants, while 
the introduction of values may even prove harmful, and endanger this spontaneous equilibrium. 
Even Keynes indirectly refers to this idea when he admits that “for at least another hundred years 
we must pretend to ourselves and to everyone that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is useful and 
fair is not. Avarice and usury and precaution must be our gods for a little longer still. For only they 
can lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into daylight.”
4 
However, the increased economic interdependence generated by global market integration and the 
complexity and growth of financial markets provides quite the opposite picture, according to which 
a lack of ethics on the part of a single financial trader in a “too big to fail” financial institution may 
trigger a worldwide catastrophic event (a quite different position from that of Mandeville’s libertine 
who,  with  all  his  vices,  only  creates  positive  economic  effects).
5 I f  w e  r e t u r n  t o  M a n d e v i l l e ’ s  
metaphor,  it  is  as  if  the  bees  (or  at  least  some  of t h e m )  w e r e  n o w  tr a n s p o r t i n g  s m a l l  n u c le a r  
weapons with their tiny legs, so that their lack of moral and civic values may endanger the survival 
not just of their own hive, but also of all the neighbouring ones.  
If we now take this into account, and add the fact that the global financial crisis has demonstrated 
how  important  trust  is  among  and  within  financial  institutions  for  the  survival  of  the  market 
economy,  we  might  rephrase  our  quotation  from  Keynes by arguing that in globally-integrated 
markets, foul is dangerous, while fair is becoming useful, since it contributes to the creation of 
economic value (as we shall see in the sections which follow).  
On the positive side, the potential contribution of values and ethics to the increased prosperity of 
economic life in globally-integrated markets has only just begun to be explored. The imbalance 
generated  by  the  interaction  of  globalized  companies  with  institutions  and  rules  which  have 
remained  largely  national  in  nature  has  triggered  a b o t t o m - u p  r e a c t i o n  f r o m  a  m i n o r i t y  o f  
“concerned” individuals who have started to “vote with their wallets”. These individuals use their 
                                                           
4 John Maynard Keynes, “The Future”, Essays in Persuasion (1931), Ch. 5 
5 Examples of this are the constant financial scandals (SocietéGenerale, Madoff, Parmalat, Enron) 
of recent years.     4 
consumption  and  savings  choices  to  vote  for  those  products  and  companies  which  are  at  the 
forefront of a three-sided efficiency which consists of creating economic value in a socially and 
environmentally responsible manner. The spread of this practice has been supported by the fact that 
socially  responsible  consumption  and  savings  impose o n ly  v e ry  w e a k  c o n d i t i o n s  o n  i n d i v i d u a l  
preferences. We do not need a strong dose of altruism to vote with the wallet, merely a form of 
enlightened or long-sighted self-interest. This is because purchasing products from firms which are 
at  the  vanguard  of  environmental  sustainability  means  supporting  innovation  towards  more 
environmentally  responsible  productive  processes,  or  providing  incentives  for  a  reduction  in 
environmental degradation and its harmful consequences which produce negative effects not just for 
future  generations  but  also  for  the  concerned  consumers  and  investors  themselves.  In  parallel, 
choosing a socially-responsible product implies supporting those firms which are more efficient in 
reconciling the creation of economic value with the well-being of their workers: a goal which, in the 
end, is in the interests of concerned consumers who wish to maximize their surplus, but whose 
satisfaction is affected even more by the enjoyment of decent working conditions. This grassroots 
action  has  successfully  triggered  a  reaction  from  corporations  which  have  found  it  optimal  to 
imitate  partially  the  behaviour  of  socially  responsible  pioneers.  This  reaction  has  been  termed 
“corporate social responsibility” (CSR). The main questions here are what the consequences of CSR 
might be for a company’s shareholders, and whether companies can afford CSR while at the same 
time having to survive and remain competitive in the market arena (see Section 4). 
The aim of our paper is to reflect on these new features in economic systems by analysing in depth 
the  interaction  among  the  three  “new”  actors:  corporate  ethical  pioneers,  concerned  economic 
agents who vote with their wallets, and profit-maximizing incumbents who are moving towards 
corporate social responsibility. 
The  paper  is  divided  into  five  sections  (introduction  and  conclusions  included).  In  the  second 
section, we examine the idea of the bottom-up action of the wallet vote in general by considering its 
potential and the threats it might pose. In the third section, we consider its application to the fields 
of trade (fair trade) and finance (microfinance, ethical banking and ethical finance), stressing the 
isomorphic nature of certain crucial elements of the economics of social responsibility in the two 
domains:  in  both  cases,  the  emergence  of  small  market  shares  enjoyed  by  new-entry  ethical 
pioneers  (whose  products  are  purchased  by  “concerned”  consumers  voting  with  their  wallets) 
triggers partial imitation on the part of profit-maximizing incumbents, thereby generating important 
contagion  effects.  In  the  fourth  section,  we  analyse  the  phenomenon  of  corporate  social 
responsibility  as  a  reaction  triggered  by  the  existence  of  the  socially  and  environmentally 
responsible consumers and investors described in the previous sections. In the final section, we 
draw some conclusions. 
 
2.  Voting  with  the  wallet:  the  potential  of,  and  limits  to,  the  bottom-up  action  of 
concerned consumers and investors   
We are on the eve of a new phase in the evolution of economic democracy. To date, bottom-up 
participation has been mainly limited to political voting. In a metaphorical sense, this limitation 
corresponds to a situation in which mankind has been walking awkwardly by hopping on one leg.   5 
The emergence of the “vote with the wallet” corresponds to a revolution in which human beings are 
learning to walk much more easily by using the left and right leg one after the other.  
Why has this form of bottom-up action emerged only in recent decades? The explanation is simple. 
Before  globalization,  the  balance  of  power  among  domestic  governments,  trade  unions  and 
corporations ensured the joint pursuit of economic growth and social cohesion. With global market 
integration,  corporations  have  suddenly  acquired  the  option  to  delocalize  production  to  places 
where social and environmental obligations (and related costs) are lower. Institutions and trade 
unions have remained local rather than becoming global. They have therefore lost bargaining power 
and have become largely unable to counter the “race to the bottom” threat raised by globalized 
corporations. One example of how this transformation changes in-depth relationships among the 
three powers is provided by the role and effectiveness of strike action. If strikes might have been 
effective during the pre-global era in demonstrating the muscle of the unions and increasing their 
bargaining  power,  in  the  era  of  globalization  they  have  become  useless,  or  even  harmful,  as 
instruments for defending the labour rights of unskilled workers in high-income countries who work 
in  industries  which  sell  tradable  goods.  This  is  because  in  globally  integrated  economies,  any 
success that they may have simply ends up by increasing the labour cost differential of production 
in  high-  or  low-income  countries,  and  therefore  increases  the  probability  that  companies  will 
delocalize, or else lose their competitiveness if they remain in high-income countries.  
This is one of the reasons why in this modified scenario citizens have become progressively more 
aware of the need to move “from the streets to the shop”, acknowledging that their bargaining 
power can be regained by using their wallet vote to affect shares of corporate consumption. A 
minority of engaged and concerned consumers is becoming increasingly aware that a wallet vote is 
more effective than a political vote, given that even very small changes in terms of sales and market 
share can have a powerful impact on corporations. This is because for these corporations, small 
shortfalls on their target sales or expected earnings can generate significant negative effects on their 
stock market value, or on the reputation and survival of their managers. In simpler terms, if only a 
few individuals change their political vote, nothing will happen, while if only one goes to his/her 
bank and says s/he wants to move his/her account to another bank for social and environmental 
reasons, the branch director will try to persuade him/her not to do so, because this decision will 
impact on his/her performance and bonus. 
One crucial point is that, in spite of our introductory discussion on the limitations of the restrictive 
homo economicus paradigm, and the need to broaden it , the strength of the vote with the wallet lies 
in the fact that it does not require extreme departures from self-interested preferences, since it is not 
a  matter  of  altruism,  but  more  simply  of  long-sighted  self-interest.  Buying  an  environmentally 
responsible product is to send a signal of approval through the market to those companies which are 
more effective in reconciling the creation of economic value with environmental responsibility, or 
which  are  more  efficient  in  waste  management  and  the  abatement  of  pollution,  and  therefore 
contribute to reducing pollution and its harmful consequences on health and global warming. In this 
sense, voting with the wallet for a more environmentally-responsible company means pursuing 
one’s  own  long-sighted  self-interest,  given  that  environmental  degradation  can  no  longer  be 
considered a matter for future rather than current generations.    6 
In the same way, using one’s purchases to show approval and economic consensus in regard to a 
company  which  is  at  the  forefront  in  reconciling  standard  economic  efficiency  with  social 
responsibility  and  care  for  workers’  rights  is  an  important  action  which  creates  incentives  to 
increase the level of corporate attention to workers rights by rewarding this attention economically. 
This implies that concerned consumers who vote with their wallets are contributing to their own 
interest in enjoying decent working conditions as workers. We may state with certainty, in fact, that 
if an influential share of consumers were to become aware tomorrow of the potential of the vote 
with the wallet, and if, say, 50 percent of consumers supported firms at the forefront of the three-
sided efficiency owing to their ability to create economic value in a socially and environmentally 
responsible manner, the world would change. 
What, therefore, are the problems which prevent people from doing something which is ultimately 
in their own interest, and from thereby achieving an improvement in their well-being which seems 
to be within reach? The three main hurdles to achievement of this goal are coordination failure, 
information, asymmetry, and search cost differentials.  
According to the first of these factors, in order to be effective, the act of voting with the wallet must 
be pursued by a large number of consumers at the same time. Let us imagine, as is often (but not 
always) the case, that this action entails a cost which is represented by the positive price differential 
between an “ethical” and a standard product which are otherwise identical. In this case, we face a 
multi-player prisoner’s dilemma, where the payoffs are such that the socially responsible choice is 
Pareto-superior, if, and only if, a certain number of other consumers follow the same course of 
action. The cost differential paid by the concerned consumers is, in fact, more than offset by moves 
in a socially and environmentally responsible direction by the company involved and the economy 
(moves which are in the interest of the consumer), but only if the share of those voting with their 
wallets is sufficiently (minimally) high. If, on the other hand, each player expects the others to 
pursue short-sighted self-interest and buy the standard product, we end up in a suboptimal Nash 
equilibrium  in  which  everyone  finds  it  optimal  to  buy  the  standard  product,  and  the  market 
incentive which might stimulate companies to behave in a socially and environmentally-responsible 
manner is not produced. Expectations such as these are likely to be realized simply because social 
responsibility is not common knowledge, or because concerned consumers may think that other 
consumers are not aware of this opportunity (or that they are aware of it, but are short-sighted). This 
is a typical case in which a lack of hope and trust is self-fulfilling. Furthermore, just as in the 
standard prisoner’s dilemma, the vote-with-the- wallet game is simultaneous and non-cooperative 
(it is impossible for all participants to coordinate their actions in advance), and this further reduces 
coordination opportunities. Needless to say, this is a multiplayer and not a two player game and the 
presence of a vast number of people makes coordination of a vast number of people even more 
difficult to achieve. 
The second main problem, asymmetric information, plagues the social responsibility market as it 
does almost all other situations in economic life. The effect of asymmetric information in second-
hand sales, job hiring and credit markets has been extensively analysed in the economic literature 
for decades.
6 The main pathologies it can create (moral hazard, adverse selection) can be solved 
                                                           
6Three essential references on asymmetric information are those of the three authors who jointly 
received the Nobel Prize for research in this field: Akerlof (1982) for moral hazard and the market   7 
only if a counterpart with superior information has effective signalling strategies available. In our 
case, the seller has superior information about the ethical quality of the product. This characteristic 
is not, unfortunately, an experience good: that is, a feature by which asymmetric information can be 
eliminated by purchasing and tasting the product. In other words, if a consumer drinks more cups of 
socially responsible coffee, she makes no progress in her evaluation of the effectiveness of the seller 
in addressing social and environmental issues. This is the reason why a large number of labelling 
companies and rating agencies have been born in the “ethical industry”.  The survival of these 
companies depends on their reputation for producing reliable and accurate evaluations of the ethical 
stance of the firms that they observe. However, since their revenues are often correlated with the 
volume of labelled or rated ethical products sold, these organisations are often supposed  to be 
erring on the side of leniency, especially toward large companies. A further limitation is that small 
firms may find the fixed costs of certification or monitoring unaffordable, so that they tend not to be 
rated. This results in a negative reputation signal being unintentionally sent to the market.  
Finally, search cost differentials also play a role. It is often the case that ethical products are not as 
widely distributed as standard products. This implies that consumers who want to vote with their 
wallets are forced to pay additional search costs. 
Coordination  failures,  asymmetric,  information  and  search  cost  differentials  are  the  three  main 
factors  which  can  explain  the  gap  between  the  potential and effective  market shares of ethical 
products  sold  by  socially  and  environmentally  responsible  companies.  A  significant  number  of 
consumer surveys have  documented the extremely large share of citizens who prefer ethical to 
standard products.
7 In principle, ethical responsibility acts like technological progress in vertical 
differentiation models: coeteris paribus, the addition of an ethical characteristic should shift all 
consumers toward the ethical product, exactly as in the case of new technology. Consumer surveys 
document, however, that even if a cost differential exists, the share of consumers willing to buy the 
ethical product remains high. This is perfectly rational, and compatible with a situation in which the 
satisfaction of other-regarding preferences (including forms of inequity aversion, reciprocity and 
pure or impure altruism) more than compensates for the cost differential between the two products. 
However,  as  well  known,  the  contingent  evaluation  literature  (Carson  et  al.  2001)  has  widely 
documented the existence of an upward bias in these declarations, since the individuals interviewed 
have had no problem in declaring that they are ethical in principle if this declaration entails no 
costs.  This  is  why  real-life  situations,  in  which  consumers  actually  choose  between  the  two 
products, provide much more reliable figures on the actual willingness of consumers to vote with 
their wallets. 
The recent studies most interesting from this point of view have included measurements of an actual 
willingness to pay in quasi-natural experiments. Hiscox and Smyth (2010) attached information on 
a corporate socially responsible stance to the display case of a candle seller in ABC Carpet and 
Home in New York, a store visited by more than 22,000 consumers every week. Another candle 
seller had its window just opposite the first one, and adopted the same social standards, but did not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
for lemons, Stiglitz  for efficiency wages inlabour markets(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1982), and Spence 
(1973) for signalling models. 
7 See, among others, consumer surveys from Italy (IREF), the UK (Bird and Hughes, 1997) and 
Belgium (De Pelsmacker, Driesen and Rayp, 2003)     8 
advertise them in the experiment. The attractive element of this research is that the experimenters 
did not create an artificial laboratory environment. Instead, they slightly modified, with a “soft 
treatment”, the standard scenario in which consumers found themselves when visiting the store. 
Furthermore, the treated and untreated products were so similar that search cost differentials were 
not a confounding factor. As should be the case in all experimental settings, this enabled  evaluation 
(by comparing treatment and control) of the effect of the variation of a single characteristic (i.e. 
socially  responsible  advertising)  on  consumer  behaviour.  The  experiment  documented  that  the 
market share of the candles advertising their CSR stance rose by between 20 to 40 percent over the 
treatment period. The result persisted during a further treatment in which the same product was sold 
at a price which had been increased by15 percent. 
In a different framework, Hiscox, Broukhim, Litwin and Volosky (2011) evaluated the effects on 
the willingness to pay and reservation prices relating to the CSR characteristics of products in 
online auctions on eBay. They showed that the treatment led to a 45 percent premium being paid on 
polo shirts. This implies that the treatment significantly increased the willingness to pay of the 
participant with the highest reservation price. 
One main objection to the vote-with-the-wallet approach is that it implicitly legitimates market 
deregulation and the downgrading of standard political action. The answer to this objection is that 
grassroots action originates from an awareness that this loss of power is already an ongoing factor, 
and that grassroots action is intended to be a complement to, and not a substitute for, standard 
institutional and political action. Indeed, the grassroots action of voting with the wallet may give 
new bargaining power to political action. Unless we rely on the isolated actions of charismatic and 
enlightened  political  leaders,  the  likelihood  of  success  for  political  action  largely  depends  on 
bottom-up support from society. Cooter’s (1988) well-known concept of an expressive law states 
that  the  effective  enforcement  and  success  of  a  legal  rule  depend  on  its  consistency  with  the 
underlying social and moral norms of a society. Just as NGOs fighting the death penalty try to 
achieve their goal by convincing the majority of voters to be against it (and not just by trying to 
persuade political leaders), so creating a consensus for social and environmental responsibility may 
significantly increase the possibility of success of political actions. 
Voting with the wallet also represents an important innovation which can improve the functions and 
“reputation” of the market. The well-known welfare theorems of neoclassical theory illustrate a 
fundamental benefit, but also a limitation, of market mechanisms. From the Edgeworth box we 
know that, starting from a given endowment of resources, the market enables individuals to find a 
Pareto-superior equilibrium through the exchange of goods or services. By definition, any market 
transaction between two agents with free will implies, if it is completed, that those who participate 
in the transaction are no worse off after than they were before it. However, certain transactions 
(such as, for instance, the extreme case of poor individuals who deliberately and freely agree to sell 
a  kidney  to  improve  their  economic  situation)  do  not  contribute  to  the  good  reputation  of  the 
market, even though they still include the benefits discussed above (transactors with free will decide 
to make the exchange because they believe they will be no worse off after it has been concluded). 
This example reveals the limitations of the market: that is, its incapacity to affect inequality in the   9 
distribution  of  endowments  through  which  economic  agents  arrive  at  a  transaction.
8 S t a n d a r d  
economic theory establishes that the inequality problem should be solved by institutions and their 
policies. However, (domestic) policies are generally oriented towards satisfying the interests of the 
median voter, and have difficulty with addressing the problems of the poor and global public goods. 
This is why concerned economic agents voting with their wallets may address both efficiency and 
equity issues with their consumption and investment choices by voting for products which promote 
inclusion and capacity-building for the poor. In this sense, a vote with the wallet may therefore 
make a positive contribution to the reputation of the market by partially amending this limitation, 
and  enlarging    the  role  and  potential  of  market  transactions.  This  is  because,  when  socially 
responsible consumers buy an ethical product, they do not just enjoy the standard efficiency gains 
illustrated  by  the  Edgeworth  box  but  also  contribute  through  their  choice  to  the  promotion  of 
inclusion and equal opportunities for certain categories of transactors, thereby reducing inequality 
in the distribution of endowments.
9 
 
3.  Socially responsible pioneers 
One  of  the  most  important  factors  leading  to  the  emergence  of  the  economics  of  social 
responsibility has been the “alliance” between “concerned” consumers voting with their wallets and 
socially responsible non-profit-maximizing pioneers. Tiny market shares of products sold by such 
pioneers to responsible consumers have confuted both anthropological (individuals are 100 percent 
myopically self-interested) and corporate (only profit-maximizing firms exist and can survive on the 
market)  reductionism,  and  made  incumbent  profit-maximizing  firms  aware  of  the  potential  of 
ethical purchases, thereby triggering their reaction, which takes the form of partial imitation. In the 
following sections, we briefly discuss the characteristics of these pioneers and ethical competition 
with  reference  to  the  specific  cases  of  fair  trade, e t h i c a l  f i n a n c e  a n d  m i c r o f i n a n c e .  W e  w o u l d  
emphasize that we are interested in these specific cases here simply because they represent the most 
successful historical experiences related to voting with the wallet. It is, however, a much more 
wide-ranging concept, which will, in principle, be applicable to all areas of the market economy in 
the future. Finally, we discuss the features and potential of the competitive reaction from profit-
maximizing  incumbents  which  try  to  satisfy  the  increase  in  consumer  sensitivity  to  the  issue 
through their CSR strategies. 
                                                           
8 T h e  k i d n e y  s a l e  d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e  i s ,  i n  f a c t ,  p e r f e ctly  compatible  with  the  Edgeworth  box 
structure, with the only peculiar feature being that the endowment point is extremely close to the 
origin of the axis of one of the two transactors (meaning that the endowments with which the two 
agents arrive in the market are quite unequal). 
9 Note that, in order to examine the effect of this action in depth, we need to abandon the static 
analytical framework of the Edgeworth box. This is because any static analytical framework tends 
to fix individuals to their starting conditions, while only dynamic approaches may allow us to 
understand that policies of inclusion and promotion of equal opportunities may  be dy namically 
convenient,  even  though  they  may  appear  statically  inefficient  (see  also  section  3.1  and  the 
theoretical fair trade debate on this point). 
   10 
 
3.1 Fair trade 
Ropi is a small village in Ethiopia, located 320 km from the capital, and 70 km from the town of 
Shashemane. The village farmers produce wheat in the rainy season, but have no direct access to 
consumers. They are therefore forced to sell their crops to  monopolistic intermediaries who take 
the product to Shashemane. In the rainy season, Ropi’s farmers become net buyers of the very 
source of their living, and have to buy wheat from the same monopolistic intermediaries at a price 
which is usually double that of the rainy season. This is similar to that of other groups of producers, 
such as Kenyan farmers in Meru Central District and Tharaka, located approximately 200 km from 
Nairobi, on the eastern slopes of Mount Kenya (Becchetti and Costantino, 2008), and handicraft 
producers in the District of Juliaca  (Department of Puno) located around Lake Titicaca. What this 
tells us is that poverty often results from a lack of market access, insufficient productivity, and low 
bargaining  power  which  prevent  producers  from  scaling  the  value  chain.  It  also  tells  us  that 
technological innovation per se does not solve the problem if it is not accompanied by an increase 
in the bargaining power and technological skills of these small, isolated producers. 
Fair trade was born to address this issue, since it consists in the offer of an alternative distribution 
and sale channel to these groups, whose productive advancement is fostered by a price premium 
paid by consumers, and transferred by importers to the producers and their organisations in order to 
finance skill upgrading and local public goods. Fair trade can be therefore viewed as a means to 
promote the inclusion of marginalised farmers with a package of benefits which include, together 
with  the  price  premium,  improved  market  access,  export  services,  price  stabilisation,  capacity 
building, environmental sustainability, and the provision of local public goods.
10 Fair trade products 
can be recognised by consumers from the label, which is available to producers’ organisations if the 
overall value  chain meets all the social and environmental standards specified in the  fair trade 
charter. 
Fair trade sales have grown significantly in the past decade. Between 2006 and 2007, total fair trade 
sales registered a 127% volume and a 72% retail value increase. Growth in Europe has been around 
50% per year over the past six years. The Fairtrade Foundation documents that fair trade bananas 
have reached 50 percent of market share in Switzerland, and 25 percent in the UK, following their 
                                                           
10According to the IFAT (the main international organisation which gathers together producers and 
fair trade organizations), these criteria are: i) creating opportunities for economically disadvantaged 
producers; ii) transparency and accountability; iii) capacity building; iv) promoting fair trade; v) 
payment of a fair price; vi) gender equity; vii) working conditions (a healthy working environment 
for  producers.  The  participation  of  children,  if  any,  does  not  adversely  affect  their  well-being, 
security, educational requirements and need for play, and conforms to the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, as well as the law and norms in the local context); viii) the environment; ix) 
trade  relations  (fair  trade  organizations  trade  with  concern  for  the  social,  economic  and 
environmental well-being of marginalized small producers, and do not  maximise profit at their 
expense. They maintain long-term relationships based on solidarity, trust and mutual respect that 
contribute to the promotion and growth of fair trade. Whenever possible, producers are assisted with 
access to pre-harvest or pre-production advance payment).   11 
introduction  into  most  supermarket  chains.
11  F a i r  t r a d e  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  o u r  
research because it represents one of the most successful and well-established examples of alliance 
between not-for-profit corporate pioneers and concerned consumers who vote with their wallets. As 
such, it represents direct, non-experimental proof that the reductionist view of economic agents (as 
100 percent myopically self-interested) and companies (whose only goal is profit maximisation) is a 
partial view of the reality.  
Fair trade also represents an example of how consumption is becoming increasingly a symbolic 
action where the physical qualities of the product are only one of the reasons for making a purchase. 
Purchasing choices may be affected by the need to conform to a group (especially in the case of 
teenagers) or, on the contrary, by the need to distance oneself from the mass (when consumers 
search  for  exclusivity).  More  generally,  by  an  act  of  consumption,  consumers  seek  to  satisfy 
complex preferences and their desire to buy goods which match their lifestyles. In this sense, fair 
trade products may be viewed as an interesting bundle in which a standard physical product is sold 
together with an intangible social and/or environmental content (Besley and Ghatak, 2007), where 
the latter component is fundamental for increasing the value of the bundle for consumers who 
cannot, however, verify its specific quality directly.  
The theoretical literature attempting to analyse the pros and cons of this phenomenon has grown 
significantly over the past decade, although it is difficult to formalize its multiple characteristics in a 
single model, and a partial analysis of only one of them at a time runs the risk of misrepresenting 
the overall impact of the initiative (see, among others, LeClair, 2002; Maseland and De Vaal, 2002; 
Moore, 2004; Hayes, 2004 and Redfern and Sneker, 2002).   
One main criticism of standard economic theory as applied to fair trade is that the price premium is 
a non-market clearing price which creates excess supply and provides the wrong kind of incentives 
to farmers. A second criticism is that, in a static partial equilibrium framework, producers may 
achieve the same level of satisfaction in an alternative scenario in which consumers buy a standard 
product without a price premium, and use the surplus to make a donation to the farmers (LeClair, 
2002). The former criticism is valid only in a static situation in which there is equal bargaining 
power between demand and supply, while the Ropi story tells us that this is mostly not the case in 
the relationship between marginalised producers with no direct access to markets and monopolistic 
transportation intermediaries. In this latter case, even the standard textbook economic theory of 
monopsony tells us that market prices are suboptimal, and affected by this imbalance of powers, 
and that consequently higher prices may help to bridge the gap with socially optimal prices.   
A second argument is that a fair trade product is not just the same non-ethical product sold at a price 
premium, but a completely different product, just as it is incorrect to consider organic and non-
organic products to be the same goods with different prices. To be more precise, we might perceive 
fair trade as a general purpose innovation creating a new variety of products. In this conceptual 
framework, the price premium should be perceived not as a distortion, but as a different partitioning 
of value in the value chain between producers and importers (whose goals are detailed in the charter 
of fair trade principles). This innovation is exactly what creates additional demand for the final 
                                                           
11Consumers  international  (2010)  Checked  out:  Are  European  supermarkets  living  up  to  their 
responsibilities for labour conditions in the developing world? Consumers international.   12 
product, and it is justifiable if it satisfies consumers’ ethical tastes (or insofar as consumers are 
willing to pay for it) (Becchetti and Huybrechts, 2008 and Becchetti and Costantino, 2010). 
If we turn to the second criticism (that by LeClair), it must be observed that if we depart from a 
partial equilibrium static analysis, the fair trade circuit offers a number of advantages compared 
with the standard “purchase plus charity” pattern, the reason for this being that charity has no 
“antitrust effects”: that is, it does not contribute directly (by opening a new distribution channel) to 
an increase in the bargaining power of marginalized versus monopsonistic intermediaries along the 
value chain. In addition, with the standard “purchase plus charity” pattern, there is no multipurpose 
innovation which creates a new range of products combining physical and ethical features, and 
satisfying the taste of “ethically concerned” consumers for variety and solidarity. 
For these reasons, several more recent studies have demonstrated that fair trade, far from being a 
heresy,  may  contribute  to  solving  certain  market  failures  addressed  by  the  standard  economic 
theory. Along these lines, Reinstein and Song (2008) have developed a theoretical model showing 
how  consumption  by  fair  trade  consumers  is  compatible  with  rational  and  informed  behaviour 
which  helps  to  address  farmers’  underinvestment  problems  in  a  competitive  setting  under 
asymmetric information. Poret and Chambolle (2007) provide additional theoretical evidence on the 
gains in efficiency which may potentially be achieved by fair trade through product differentiation. 
Last, Maseland and De Vaal (2002) document that under restrictive parametric conditions fair trade 
represents a first best over the alternatives of free trade and protectionism from the perspective of 
standard international trade models. 
Beyond its limits a crucial aspect of the fair trade story is the capacity of this alliance between 
concerned consumers and corporate pioneers to trigger contagion, as also recognised in a recent 
document  by  the  EU  Commission.
12 W h e n  f a i r  tr a d e  n e w c o m e r s  s t a r t  r e t a i l i n g  “ p u b l i c  goods” 
(Besley and Ghatak, 2007),
13 they achieve small market shares. This result comes as a surprise to 
incumbent  companies  since,  if  we  are  to  believe  corporate  and  anthropological  reductionism 
(section 3), there should be no space for fair trade deals in the market. The theoretical literature has 
documented that under reasonable parametric conditions, the not-for-profit pioneers trigger (partial) 
imitation  on  the  part  of  profit-maximising  incumbents,  thereby  providing  a  rationale  for  the 
phenomenon of corporate social responsibility (Becchetti and Solferino, 2010). In the specific case 
of fair trade, these models explain why large multinationals such as Nestlé, Starbucks, Sainsbury’s 
and  many  supermarket  chains  have  started  producing, d i s t r i b u t i n g  a n d / o r  r e t a i l i n g  f a i r  t r a d e  
products, while other multinationals such as Chiquita have introduced their own similar ethical 
standards.  
What we have described above illustrates how the alliance between a vote with the wallet and 
corporate pioneers has transformed social responsibility into a competitive factor. The main issue of 
                                                           
12“ Fair Trade has played a pioneering role in illuminating issues of responsibility and solidarity, 
which has impacted other operators and prompted the emergence of other sustainability regimes. 
Trade-related  private  sustainability  initiatives  use  various  social  or  environmental  auditing 
standards, which have grown in number and market share.” EU Commission 2009  
13The industrial organization literature models  competition in CSR by considering the latter an 
additional  feature  of  the  product  (see,  among  others,  Bagnoli  and  Watts,  2003  and  Arora  and 
Gangopadyhay, 1995).   13 
interest  today  is  the  evolution  of  the  competitive  race  between  pioneers  and  imitators.  By 
“decomposing” pioneers into three distinct actors - dedicated retailers (world shops), importers and 
labelling companies - we can see that their reactions to imitation by profit-maximising incumbents 
have been different.  
The pioneers with the lowest levels of freedom (dedicated retailers) have strongly criticized any 
relationship with imitators by identifying it as a threat to their survival and to the “purity” of the fair 
trade movement. Importers, by contrast, have benefited from the opportunity to diversify their sales 
channels by accepting the possibility of selling to supermarkets as well, while opposing products 
with fair trade characteristics produced by imitators. At the other extreme, labelling companies have 
decided to place their labels also on imitators’ products if they meet fair trade standards, even 
though fair trade products represent a tiny share of the imitators’ revenues. The reaction of fair trade 
importers  to  this  decision  by  the  labelling  companies  has  been  to  create  a  new  label  which 
advertises their “difference” and competitive advantage: that is, the fact that a given product comes 
from an organisation which is 100 percent dedicated to fair trade. 
Far from being ideological, this is the optimal rational reaction of pioneers to the competitive threat 
raised by imitators. Imitators are generally much larger in size, and can easily replicate any specific 
product or initiative by the pioneers, and even engage in forms of social dumping (that is, selling 
fair trade products at a discount with respect to the pioneers) as a form of CSR policy. What they 
cannot do, if they continue to pursue profit maximisation, is convert more than a tiny part of their 
activity to fair trade standards, as this would dramatically reduce their margins. This is why the only 
possible optimal reaction of pioneers is to use a new label signalling to concerned consumers their 
unique competitive advantage, which cannot be replicated by imitators: their 100 percent dedication 
to fair trade. 
 
3.2 Ethical finance 
Ethically  concerned  investors  may  vote  with  their  wallets  by  choosing  ethical  funds  or  ethical 
financial institutions, exactly as concerned consumers do by preferring to consume products from 
ethical pioneers or their closest imitators. 
Financial  intermediaries  whose  goals  are  not  profit m a x i m i z a t i o n  a r e  n o t  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  i n  t h e  
current  economic  scenario.  As  Canning  et  al.  (2003) r e m a r k ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  e v e n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund operate like non-profit-
maximizing financial institutions. In this section, we will briefly sketch three types of them, starting 
from the historical tradition of cooperative banks and then moving to the more recent examples of 
microfinance and ethical financial pioneers which directly create new opportunities for concerned 
investors  to  vote  with  their  wallets,  and  promote  three-sided  efficiency  through  their  financial 
support of projects and companies which create economic value in a socially and environmentally 
sustainable way. 
The  main  historical  differences  between  cooperative a n d  s t a n d a r d  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  l i e  i n  
governance (the one person/one vote rule, as against the one share/one vote rule), and in constraints 
on profit distribution whereby distributions cannot be cashed in by individual shareholders, and are   14 
accumulated in the form of capital reserves (anticipating the more recent concerns expressed in 
Basel II and Basel III rules for stricter capital requirements in order to prevent systemic instability 
and financial crises). These two features, accompanied by an attitude to proximity which aims at 
reducing  asymmetric  information  and  serving  the  needs  of  local  investors,  make  their  goals 
different  from  that  of  standard  profit  maximization.  The  cooperative  banking  system  includes 
banche cooperative and banchepopolari in Italy, building societies and credit unions in the UK, and 
mutual savings and loans and credit unions in the US. Its role is by no means marginal. At a world 
level,  financial  cooperatives  serve  over  621  million  people  in  the  G-20  nations  alone,  provide 
US$3.6 trillion in loans, hold US$4.4 trillion of savings, and have US$ 7.6 trillion of total assets.
14 
In  2007,  cooperative  banks  had  an  average  25%  market  share  of  loans  to  small  and  medium 
enterprises (SMEs), while an average of 29% of their loans were SME loans. In Italy, they account 
for a 33.7 percent market share of deposits, and a 29.5 percent share of loan volumes; they make up 
60 percent of all branches in France, compared with 50 percent in Austria and about 40 percent in 
Germany and the Netherlands  (Bongini-Ferri, 2007). 
The new generation of ethical and social banks is innovative in several respects compared with this 
tradition.  First,  microfinance  institutions  successfully  address  the  issue  of  matching  those  with 
productive ideas with those with financial resources, in cases where the two do not overlap. In fact, 
one limitation of the traditional banking system lies in the difficulty in financing non-collateralized 
borrowers.  Modern  microfinance  provides  a  series  of m e c h a n i s m s  ( g r o u p  l e n d i n g  w i t h  j o i n t  
liability, progressive loans, and notional collateral) which help to overcome this limitation, thereby 
allowing access to credit by individuals who are considered “unbankable” by the traditional banking 
system (see, among others, Armendáriz de Aghion and Gollier, 2000; Banherjee and Duflo, 2010; 
Gangopadhyay,  Ghatak  and  Lensink,  2005;  Ghatak,  2000;  Laffont  and  N’Guessan,  2000; 
Chowdury, 2005; Conning, 1999 and 2005; Laffont and Rey, 2003; Stiglitz, 1990; and Ghatak at 
al., 1999). Second, ethical banks
15 select their lending opportunities not only on the basis of project 
profitability  and  capacity  to  repay  the  loan,  but  also  on  the  basis  of  the  greatest  social  and 
environmental  value.  In  this  way,  they  channel  the  resources  of  socially  and  environmentally 
concerned  depositors  who  are  even  willing  to  accept l o w e r  r e m u n e r a t i o n  f o r  t h e i r  s a v i n g s  i n  
                                                           
14 From http://icba.free.fr/IMG/pdf/G_20_MARCH_09.pdf, accessed April 30, 2009).  
15BancaEtica in Italy is an example of this new vintage of ethical banks. According to its charter of 
principles, the bank’s goal is to use its resources to finance projects with the highest social and 
environmental value after satisfaction of the economic feasibility constraint. As a result of this goal, 
the bank earned an ethical premium from investors who demonstrated that they were willing to 
finance it at below market rates. The value of the “ethical premium” became clear in the passage 
from book to market accounting (with the introduction of International Accounting Standards in 
2007),  where  the  bank’s  expected  future  revenues  were  discounted  at  a  lower  rate,  leading  to 
extraordinary profits. The BancaEtica model has been followed in Europe by other banks such as 
Triodos  Bank  (124  million  euros  of  equity  capital,  1.36  billion  euros  of  savings),  GLS 
Gemeinshaftsbank (35.5 million euros of equity capital and 567.8 million euros of savings) and 
Umwelbank (5.1 million euros of equity capital and 515.8 million euros of savings). Exactly as 
discussed in the fair trade section, the emergence of socially responsible pioneers in the financial 
industry and the consensus offered to them by “concerned” investors have caused a contagion effect 
on profit-maximising incumbents. One example of this has been the creation of BancaProssima by 
Intesa-San Paolo, the second largest Italian bank, with characteristics which are very similar to 
those of BancaEtica.   15 
exchange  for  the  promise  that  they  will  be  used  to  create  social  and  environmental  value.  A 
common characteristic of microfinance and ethical banks is precisely this “ethical premium”: that 
is, the capacity to obtain financial resources at a lower cost in exchange for the promise to create 
high social and environmental value.
16 
Microfinance  is  an  example  of  how  an  entrepreneurial  idea  which  is  not  based  on  profit 
maximization  may  be  extremely  fertile  in  generating m a n y  n e w  f i n a n c i a l  a n d  n o n - f i n a n c i a l  
businesses. The Grameen Bank (which is considered to be the founder of modern microfinance, 
even though other established microfinance institutions were already operating when it was created) 
started from scratch a decade ago to become a large bank (with 400,000 employees and more than 3 
million customers), funding an industry which counts more than 10,000microfinance programmes 
lending  to  around  155  million  borrowers,  of  which  82  million  live  in  conditions  of  poverty, 
according to 2009 data from the Microcredit Summit Campaign.  
As well known, there are various models of microfinance institutions. On the one hand, the founder 
of the Grameen Bank, Junus, defines himself as a social entrepreneur, and declares that the specific 
goal  of  the  Grameen  Bank  is  to  promote  equal  opportunities  by  allowing  access  to  credit  by 
“unbankables”. Other microfinance organisations, on the other hand, do not conceal their profit-
maximising goals. The difference between the two is mainly in terms of lending rates, which are 
much higher in the latter case than in the former. It is therefore clear that only the first microfinance 
model is relevant to our analysis of socially responsible non-profit-maximising pioneers.  
One of the most surprising features of microfinance is its unexpectedly low share of nonperforming 
loans in the absence of formal financial guarantees.
17 In this respect, one of the main data sources 
for the industry – the Micro Banking Bulletin (http://www.mixmbb.org/en), which created a panel 
of 1019 MFIs from different continents – reports an average sample loan loss rate of one percent in 
2005. This success questions the standard theory, which regards formal guarantees as fundamental 
for the prevention of opportunistic behaviour by borrowers and the reduction of lenders’ losses 
when they default. 
The recent history of microfinance provides a clear-cut example of how corporate profits and the 
creation  of  economic  value  at  the  aggregate  level  may not coincide. The well-known trade-off 
between profitability and the outreach of microfinance institutions establishes that the more these 
institutions try to promote access to credit by the low end of income earners, the less profitable they 
are. The obvious reason for this is that the fixed costs involved in bringing credit to the very poor 
are  much  higher  than  those  of  financing  an  established  company.  This  is  why  the  capacity  of 
microfinance to relieve poverty is significantly aided by the opportunity to pay financial resources 
                                                           
16 To provide an extreme example, Kiva (http://www.kiva.org/) is an electronic platform by which 
anyone can lend small sums “directly” to poor, uncollateralized borrowers on the basis of a simple 
promise of restitution of the sum without interest. Kiva has been extremely successful in pooling 
small  sums  from  all  over  the  world  and  channeling  them  without  extra  cost  to  its  network  of 
potential borrowers. 
17 Becchetti and Conzo (2011) use a randomized field experiment to document a self-reinforcing 
effect of microfinance on loan solvency  which  contributes to explaining its performance. They 
show  that  the  granting  of  a  loan  by  the  MFI  may  act a s  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  b o r r o w e r s ’  
trustworthiness in their local communities, thereby increasing their reputation and pay offs from 
business activities.   16 
at a lower cost from investors with other-regarding preferences who are willing to trade higher 
returns for the non-pecuniary satisfaction of contributing to the inclusion of the unbankables. Again, 
while reductionist predictions would have it that matching investors who do not maximize risk-
adjusted  returns  with  financial  intermediaries  who  do  not  maximise  profits  is  impossible,  as  it 
violates the purely self-regarding preference paradigm, the reality is actually quite different. In 
2009, 91 specialist microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) invested more than $6.2 billion of 
foreign  capital  in  microfinance,  an  important  part  of  which  was  represented  by  non-profit-
maximizing investors serving Grameen-like microfinance institutions  (CGAP 2010 and Morduch 
and Conning, 2011). 
 
A third and final strand of ethical finance is represented by the so-called ethical investment funds. 
The actions of these funds correspond exactly in financial investment terms to consumers’ vote with 
the wallet. Ethical investment funds try to stimulate corporate social responsibility with shareholder 
advocacy and selective investment strategies. In the former case, they propose and vote for CSR-
oriented  resolutions  at  shareholders  meetings.  In  the  latter,  they  use  restriction  criteria  in  the 
selection of stocks to be included in their portfolios, reducing the universe of investable shares to 
that of companies which meet certain social and environmental sustainability criteria (in many cases 
asking investors to formulate their own preferred ethical standards).  This type of action, just like a 
vote  with  the  wallet  by  consumers,  increases  the  economic  profitability  of  corporate  social 
responsibility, and therefore contributes to stimulating such choices by listed companies.  
Ethical investment funds are by no means a marginal element in contemporary financial markets. 
The Social Investment Forum Report (2007) states that socially responsible investments involve 
around 11 per cent of assets under professional management in the US, with a 324 percent growth 
(from US$639 billion to US$2.71 trillion) between 1995 and 2007, which is much greater than that 
of all professionally-managed assets (260 percent) over the same period. The 2010 report finds that 
this sum has risen to US$3.07 trillion. 
The  more  recent  empirical  literature  has  evaluated  the  relative  performance  of  ethical  versus 
standard  portfolios  without  obtaining  conclusive  results  in  one  or  the  other  direction  (Bauer, 
Koedijk and Otten, 2002; Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin, 2003). What seems to emerge, however, is 
that  ethical  portfolio  returns  tend  to  have  lower  variance  (Becchetti  and  Ciciretti,  2009).  This 
finding can be related to the minimization of conflicts with stakeholders by socially responsible 
constituents, but also to the more patient attitude of ethical fund investors, who buy them with a 
long-term perspective. 
 
4.  The  emergence  of  corporate  social  responsibility a s  a n  e n d o g e n o u s  o p t i m a l  r e a c t i o n  t o  
voting with the wallet 
Industrial  organization  models  demonstrate  that  the o p t i m a l  r e a c t i o n  o f  a  p r o f i t - m a x i m i z i n g  
incumbent to the entry of an ethical pioneer is partial imitation, up to the point where the marginal 
cost of becoming more socially and environmentally responsible is exactly traded off by the gain of 
a part of the market share by individuals voting with the wallet (Becchetti and Solferino, 2010).   17 
In  a  pre-globalized  world  with  a  balance  of  power  among  institutions,  trade  unions  and 
corporations, there is no need in principle for corporate social responsibility. Companies can be left 
free to pursue profit maximization, and the reconciliation of their goals with socially desirable 
outcomes in the presence of market failures (negative externalities, public goods, etc.) is ensured by 
perfectly  functioning  institutions  which  create  and e n f o r c e  p r o p e r  r u l e s .  T h e  r e a l i t y  i s  m u c h  
different  from  this  ideal  scenario,  however.  The  political  business  cycle  literature  and,  more 
generally, the economic literature have widely demonstrated that politicians and regulators are not 
“enlightened”, in that they have their own personal goals, which often conflict with institutional 
ones. Even where this is not the case, they tend to be captured by the very entities that they are 
supposed  to  regulate.    More  problematically,  globalization  has  created  a  dilemma  between 
globalized corporations, on the one hand, and institutions and rules which have remained essentially 
domestic, on the other. This implies that there is insufficient governance and regulation to address 
the problems of global public goods (such as climate) and the misrepresentation of the interests of 
the world’s poor in decisions taken by national governments.  
Globalisation is at the origin of the emergence of corporate social responsibility precisely because 
of this imbalance between powers. Companies are free to set up their productive plants (or choose 
their suppliers of intermediate inputs) in countries where social and environmental standards are 
lowest. This is why, in this international regulatory vacuum, concerned consumers and investors  
are increasingly asking them to take responsibility for their actions in order to limit the negative 
social and environmental externalities of their policies. 
The  number  of  profit-maximizing  companies  listed  on s t o c k  e x c h a n g e s  w h i c h  a d v e r t i s e  t h e i r  
socially and environmentally responsible actions is constantly growing. If these companies decide 
to spend money on this, the reason is that the reputation of CSR is important and may positively 
affect  their  revenues.  That  said,  we  may    think  of  CSR  as  an  endogenous  reaction  by  such 
companies to the emergence of concerned consumers and investors voting with their wallets. This is 
because, as we will see below, the presence of the latter significantly increases market consensus 
and the gains of CSR strategies. 
 A standard definition of CSR, based on the EU Green Book,
18 is that it is whatever goes beyond 
legal obligations. This helps us understand why CSR was not an issue in the pre-globalised era for 
firms  operating  in  countries  where  social  and  environmental  standards  were  already  very 
demanding. However, a more substantive definition of CSR is the one which acknowledges the way 
in which CSR modifies the relative power of corporate stakeholders. If the interests of shareholders 
come first for profit-maximizing firms by definition, CSR involves a shift of focus, and a greater 
level of concern for the satisfaction of a wider set of stakeholders, including workers, suppliers, 
consumers and the local community in the area in which the firm operates. 
One  main  issue  at  stake  in  the  CSR  literature  is  the  relationship  between  it  and  corporate 
performance. It is evident, in fact, that CSR can become something other than just green and social 
washing if, and only if, it does not endanger a firm’s survival in the competitive arena. If we review 
CSR criteria, we soon realize that most of them involve costly actions on the part of companies. 
Taking better care of the well-being of workers, adopting more environmentally efficient productive 
                                                           
18EU  Commission,  2001,  Promoting  a  European  framework f o r  C o r p o r a t e  S o c i a l  
ResponsibilityCOM(2001) 366 Green Paper.   18 
processes, and managing waste and reducing polluting emissions are, in principle, costly actions 
(the only directly cost-reducing CSR initiative is the limit on the compensation payable to CEOs). 
On the other side, however, there are at least six potential benefits which may compensate for these 
costs. The first is related to the impact of CSR on worker productivity and motivation, for two main 
reasons. The first is set forth by the theory of efficiency wages, which reverses the traditional nexus 
between productivity and wages. If wages should follow productivity, it is also true that under 
certain conditions productivity may follow wages. Efficiency wage theories state that when effort 
cannot be monitored due to asymmetric information, workers are less likely to shirk if they are 
better paid, since they risk losing good wages and, in general, more favourable working conditions 
(Stiglitz-Shapiro,  1982).  Higher  wages  have  also  been  shown  to  reduce  turnover  and  its  costs 
(Salop, 1979; Malcomson, 1981). Finally, the gift exchange version of this theory establishes that a 
“gift” from an employer (an unexpected voluntary transfer of monetary benefits to employees with 
no  obligation  to  reciprocate)  may  trigger  a  productivity  gift  from  those  who  have  received  it 
(Akerlof, 1982). More generally, gifts are actions which go beyond the boundaries of statutory “do-
ut-des” rules and for this reason, they have the capacity to create stronger fiduciary relationships 
among members of an organisation, thereby increasing the possibility of creating fertile economic 
relationships.  
A second line of thought related to the CSR worker-productivity relationship is that of intrinsic 
motivation.
19 If we follow it, and examine the extreme case of volunteers, we find that intrinsic 
motivation may be so strong as to induce individuals to “work for nothing” (Freeman, 1997) in 
organisations whose goals and ideals they share. This is the dream of any company which aims to 
increase the productivity of its workers. CSR may help to come closer to fulfilling this dream by 
reducing the distance between corporate goals and workers’ ideals, therefore inducing the latter to 
do more and to go beyond their contractual duties for their organisations.  
A  second  potential  positive  effect  of  CSR  on  corporate  performance  is  its  contribution  to 
minimizing conflicts with stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). The impact of these conflicts on company 
costs also depends on the rules which define powers, and the effectiveness of bottom-up initiatives 
such as class actions.  
A third effect is determined by the capacity of CSR to capture the consensus and the vote with the 
wallet of socially responsible consumers (which has to do with everything discussed in this paper). 
We have seen in Sections 2 and 3 that this kind of vote is already in operation, and contributing to 
increasing economic gains from CSR strategies. This third channel of influence clearly implies that 
                                                           
19 One definition of intrinsic motivation is provided by Deci (1975), who argues that “one is said to 
be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when he receives no apparent reward except the 
activity  itself”.  A  more  recent  extended  definition  by  Deci  and  Ryan  (2000)  runs  as  follows:  
“perhaps no single phenomenon reflects the positive potential of human nature as much as intrinsic 
motivation, the inherent tendency to seek out novelty and challenges, to extend and exercise one's 
capacities, to explore, and to learn. …  The construct of intrinsic motivation describes this natural 
inclination toward assimilation, mastery, spontaneous interest, and exploration that is so essential 
to cognitive and social development and that represents a principal source of enjoyment and vitality 
throughout life”.  
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the  positive  potential  of  CSR  in  corporate  performance  crucially  depends  on  the  sensitivity  of 
consumers to these issues.  
A fourth effect specifically concerns environmental responsibility. Leadership in this field often 
also implies being at the forefront of technological innovation in sustainable products/processes, 
anticipating the regulatory changes which are expected to be increasingly demanding from this 
point of view, to counteract pollution and climate change.  
A fifth effect is the positive impact of the perception of corporate social responsibility on the overall 
reputation of a company. Even though consumers may not be particularly sensitive to social and 
environmental issues, they may consider CSR to be a signal of the quality of a company’s products. 
This signal is particularly important in industries where the consequences of low quality may be 
particularly harmful; examples of this include the airline industry  and the financial sector. The 
banking industry is a typical case in which a scandal may have negative externalities on the sector 
overall, reducing the trust which is ultimately the crucial resource on which banks live. In this 
respect,  corporate  social  responsibility  provides  an  opportunity  for  rebuilding  trust,  by  giving 
investors  the  perception  that  the  risk  of  buying  “financial  lemons”  is  lower  when  sellers  are 
“concerned”  financial  intermediaries.  An  empirical  example  of  how  CSR  may  positively  affect 
reputation and corporate revenues is provided by Minor (2009). An analysis of abnormal stock 
returns on a sample of 184 cases of product recall shows that a CSR reputation allows a company to 
save US$600 million on average from the negative shock generated by this kind of event. The 
author’s interpretation is that, in the presence of a high CSR reputation, investors are more likely to 
think that the cause of the event was an accident rather than negligence. 
A sixth factor is that, when firms are so large that they have a significant impact on demand for 
input, their environmentally responsible policies may help them to economize on materials, thereby 
avoiding contributing to an increase in input prices. 
Do the six potential economic benefits of CSR compensate for its costs? Since the emergence of 
CSR, many empirical studies have attempted to evaluate its impact on corporate performance, but 
without obtaining conclusive results. This is because the outcome of the competitive race between 
CSR and non-CSR firms  is undetermined by definition, because it depends on factors which are in 
continual evolution, such as the sensitivity of consumers who vote with their wallets.  
The only general conclusion which can be drawn is that an increase in citizens’ concerns for social 
and environmental responsibility will increase the space and feasibility of CSR policies. Again, an 
improvement in the technology which enables citizens to reduce their search and information costs 
on the ethical features of products will greatly increase returns, and reduce the costs of corporate 
socially responsible policies.   
 
5. Conclusions 
One of the currently most promising directions in social science research lies in the progressive 
integration of single disciplines (such as economics, psychology, or sociology) which enriches each 
of  them  and  contributes  to  reducing  all  the  forms  of  reductionism  which  limit  the  capacity  to 
understand human action. With a stronger emphasis on the role, determinants and effects of social   20 
capital, and with empirical research on the determinants of life satisfaction,
20 economists and social 
scientists are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of investigating the links between the 
visible part of the economy (productivity, growth, consumption, investment, and savings) and its 
invisible  pillar  (social  capital  and  a  broadened  pattern  of  preferences)  in  order  to  gain  deeper 
understanding of the motivations behind individual choices. 
This paper has sought to make a contribution in this direction by discussing some of the promising 
paths in recent research from a unified (voting with the wallet) perspective. First, we have argued 
that  the  results  of  laboratory  and  quasi-natural  experiments,  but  even  more  so  the  preferences 
revealed  by  purchases  of  ethical  products,  urge  us  to  adopt  a  broadened  paradigm  for  human 
preferences which includes elements of reciprocity and inequity aversion, and forms of pure and 
impure altruism. Second, we believe that the alliance between ethically-concerned individuals and 
corporate socially responsible pioneers (two actors not motivated solely by myopic self-interest) is 
both the best proof of the validity of this broadened paradigm and a powerful lever with which to 
tackle social and environmental imbalances in the socioeconomic system.  
The crucial factor driving this change is the vote with the wallet: that is, an additional form of 
participation  and  economic  democracy  by  which  individuals  –  in  their  own  long-sighted  self-
interest, if not for other regarding reasons as well – use consumption and investment to reward 
companies (ethical pioneers) which are at the forefront in reconciling the creation of economic 
value with social and environmental sustainability. As we have discussed in the paper, this action 
has the crucial effect of triggering a partial imitation of the pioneers’ ethical stance on the part of 
traditional profit-maximizing companies. It is therefore contagious, and contributes to the rise in the 
phenomenon of corporate social responsibility.  
The  mechanisms  that  we  have  outlined  are  extremely  powerful.  Let  us  consider  a  general 
equilibrium model in an economy which possesses all the standard characteristics (externalities, 
public goods, and asymmetric information) which prevent decentralized equilibrium from achieving 
socially optimal outcomes. In this framework, in the presence of a share of individuals with other-
regarding preferences on the demand and supply sides, the vote-with-the-wallet mechanism may 
bring  the  system  closer  to  social  optimum  without  top-down  intervention,  doing  so  merely  by 
exploiting the forces of social responsibility: individuals with other-regarding preferences on the 
supply side find themselves better off if they create socially responsible corporate pioneers and start 
selling ethical products. These products increase the variety of products sold, and conquer small 
market shares, since they are bought by the share of consumers with other-regarding preferences on 
the demand side. The emergence of these new corporate actors, and their small market share, induce 
                                                           
20Empirical research on the drivers of life satisfaction has boomed in recent decades since the wide 
availability  of  new  data  has  for  the  first  time  allowed  economists  to  test  their  hypotheses  on 
arguments of individual utility functions directly. In spite of several methodological problems (lack 
of cardinality and limitations in the interpersonal and inter-country comparability of life satisfaction 
values) this literature has produced an incredibly consistent set of “stylised facts” and a number of 
checks  which  document  their  reliability.  The  life  satisfaction  literature  has  found  discrepancies 
between subjective and objective well-being, and provided new methods for measuring the shadow 
value of non-marked goods (for a survey, see, among others, Frey and Stutzer, 2002 and 2010; 
Clark et al., 2006).   21 
incumbent profit-maximizing companies to imitate them, thereby enlarging the supply of ethical 
products.  
We have shown in the paper, however, that the levered potential of the vote with the wallet is 
limited by coordination failures and by search and information costs. This limitation shows us the 
way  forward  for  policy  action.  The  promotion  of  ethical  ratings,  improvements  in  information 
technology on the social and environmental responsibility of producers (such as software which 
allows an iPad to download files on company characteristics from product QR codes), and green or 
ethical procurement rules, are all directions which policymakers may follow to enhance bottom-up 
participation, and make a contribution to a market solution for market failures. 
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